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Abstract—For communication in Next Generation Networks,
highly-developed mobile devices will enable users to store and
manage a lot of credentials on their terminals. Furthermore,
these terminals will represent and act on behalf of users when
accessing different networks and connecting to a wide variety
of services. In this situation, it is essential for users to trust
their terminals and for all transactions using them to be
secure. This paper analyses a number of the Authentication
and Key Agreement protocols between the users and mobile
terminals, then proposes a novel device authentication protocol.
The proposed protocol is analysed and verified using a formal
methods approach based on Casper/FDR compiler.
Keywords-Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol; De-
vice Authentication Protocols; Casper/FDR;
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the high popularization of wireless and cellular
technologies such as WLAN, WiMAX and 2.5G/ 3G net-
works, an increasing number of services will be available
in the mobile environment. Examples of these services
are e-Commerce, on line banking and electronic public
services in addition to access to email, Grid and Cloud
resources/services. End users will access these services using
mobile devices such as smart phones, PDAs and laptops.
These devices will act on behalf of the users and hence
may retain sensitive and credential information such as
passwords, security certificates, secret keys and subscription
IDs which is used to access the mobile services. This situa-
tion highlights the need for securing transactions between
the end users and their mobile devices as well as the
need for maintaining the integrity of the mobile devices.
Creating such a secure environment will emphasise on the
trustworthiness of mobile devices and encourage end users
to delegate their devices the communication with sensitive
services.
Therefore, this paper analyses some Authentication and
Key Agreement (AKA) protocols in the literature such as the
AKA protocol in [2] and the AKA protocol of Mobile Eth-
ernet [3]. Based on this analysis, a two-stage AKA protocol
is introduced. In the first stage, the protocol achieves mutual
authentication and sets up a secure connection between the
mobile device and the Personal Identification Card (PIC)
which, similar to the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and
Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) cards in GSM
and UMTS, holds security and subscription information. The
second stage of the protocol authenticates the user to use
the mobile device based on biometric information, and thus
mutual authentication between the Mobile device, the PIC
and the end user is achieved. Furthermore, the proposed
protocol is authenticated using CASPER/FDR compiler [4]
which is a formal methods-based approach that accepts an
abstract description of systems and translates them into
Communication Sequential Processes (CSP) [5], the gener-
ated CSP description is then verified using the the Failure
Divergence Refinement (FDR) model checker [6].
The contributions of this work are as follows: Firstly,
using Casper/FDR, we formally model some of the initial
AKA protocols such as the one proposed by the Mobile
Ethernet [3] and analyse the discovered attack. Secondly,
to address the discovered drawbacks of the protocol in the
literature, a new AKA protocol is introduced. The proposed
protocol is modelled using Casper/FDR and then analysed
against a number of desired security properties.
The rest of paper is organized as follows: Section 2
describes related work in the literature. The proposed AKA
protocol is introduced and analysed in Section 3. The paper
concludes in Section 4.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Verifying Security Protocols Using Casper/FDR
Previously, analysing security protocols used to be done
using two stages. Firstly, modelling the protocol using
a theoretical notation or language such as the CSP [5].
Secondly, verifying the protocol using a model checker such
as Failures-Divergence Refinement (FDR) [6].
However, describing a system or a protocol using CSP
is a quite difficult and error-prone task; therefore, Gavin
Lowe [4] has developed the CASPER/FDR tool to model
security protocols, it accepts a simple and human-friendly
input file that describes the system and compiles it into CSP
code which is then checked using the FDR model checker.
Casper/FDR has been used to model communication and
security protocols as in [7], [8], [9]. The CASPER’s input
Table I
THE HEADERS OF CASPER’S INPUT FILE
The Header Description
# Free Variables Defines the agents, variables and func-
tions in the protocol
# Processes Represents each agent as a process
# Protocol Description Shows all the messages exchanged be-
tween the agents
# Specification Specifies the security properties to be
checked
# Actual Variables Defines the real variables, in the actual
system to be checked
# Functions Defines all the functions used in the pro-
tocol
# System Lists the agents participating in the actual
system with their parameters instantiated
# Intruder Information Specifies the intruder’s knowledge and
capabilities
file that describes the systems consists of eight headers as
explained in Table I:
B. Desired Security Features for AKA protocols
As stated in [10], it is desired for AKA protocols to meet
certain security properties. Therefore, a list of these proper-
ties will be used to analyse the proposed AKA protocol in
this paper.
1) Mutual Entity Authentication: This is achieved when
each party is assured of the identity of the other party.
2) Mutual Key Authentication: This is achieved when
each party is assured that no other party aside from a
specifically identified second party gains access to a
particular secret key.
3) Mutual Key Confirmation: This requirement means
that each party should be assured that the other has
possession of a particular secret key.
4) Key Freshness: a key is considered fresh if it can be
guaranteed to be new and not reused through actions
of either an adversary or authorized party.
5) Unknown-Key Share: In this attack the two parties
compute the same session key but have different views
of their peers in the key exchange. In other words,
in this attack an entity A ends up believing that it
shares a key with B; although this is the case, B
mistakenly believes the key is instead shared with an
entity E 6= A.
6) Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience: This prop-
erty implies that if the Intruder compromised the long-
term key of one party, he should not be able to
masquerade to the party as a different party.
C. AKA and Authorization Scheme
In [2], the authors propose an AKA and Authoriza-
tion framework for 4G networks. At the initial stage, the
framework combines password, Biometric information as
well as public key infrastructure (PKI) to achieve mutual
authentication between the user, the SIM card and the device.
Based on the result of the authentication in the initial stage,
the framework achieves authentication between the mobile
device and the network.
Although it is stated in [2] that the framework was proven
to be scalable and provides some desired security features
such as multi-prong mutual authentication, the framework
suffers from two major drawbacks: firstly, in order to provide
a considerably robust platform for user access to sensitive
services and data and achieve the authentication process
in the initial stage, the framework associates the Trusted
Computing (TC) with the PKI by implementing Trusted
Mobile Platform (TMP) [11]. These represent major modifi-
cations to the architecture of mobile devices. Secondly, some
of the required functions to deal with the PKI-complexity
and checking the integrity of the mobile terminal do not
consider the limitations of battery and processing power in
small devices such as Mobile terminals and Personal Digital
Assistant (PDAs). These two reasons make the framework
inapplicable with current architecture and capabilities of
mobile devices.
D. The Device Authentication Protocol of the Mobile Eth-
ernet Security Framework
The Mobile Ethernet group has in [3] proposed an AKA
framework that deals with security at the network and
service levels as well as achieving mutual authentication
between the user, SIM card (here referred to as The Personal
Identification Card (PIC)) and the mobile terminal. The
security system comprises the following entities:
• The Personal Identification Card (PIC): Similarly to the
SIM card in 2, 2.5 and 3G technologies [1], the PIC
holds user’s credentials such as the subscribed services’
IDs and security keys.
• The Mobile Terminal (MT): Is the user’s device.
The solution proposed by the Mobile Ethernet Group
comprises two-stage authentication protocol; the first stage
is used in the initial authentication; when the PIC is plugged
into the MT for the first time. This stage is based on PKI
and it aims at achieving a mutual authentication between the
MT and PIC and agreeing on a secret key (K) which will be
stored in the PIC and the MT. After the initial authentication,
a simplified protocol, based on the derived secret key (K),
is used for any subsequent authentication process.
Similar to the case of the previous AKA in subsection
II-C, due to its complexity, the author believes that PKI is not
suitable for small devices. Furthermore, as will be explained
in the following subsection, the formal verification results
show attack against the authentication protocol in the second
stage.
1) Analysing the Device Authentication Protocol of the
Mobile Ethernet: As described in [3], after running the
initial authentication protocol, the PIC and the MT will agree
on a secret key (K), which will facilitate the subsequent
authentications. By considering the notation in Table II, the
authentication protocol runs as follows:
Table II
NOTATION.
Abbreviation Full name and description
PIC The Personal Identification (PIC), initially shares
SK(MT) with the MT and holds the (UK)
MT Mobile Terminal
r1, r2 Random numbers
K A pre-shared secret key between the MT and the
PIC
Req An authentication request message
MAC{m}K Message authentication code of message (m) using
the key (K)
The mobile terminal sends an authentication request
(Req) to the PIC, which responds by sending a random
value (R1) as a challenge towards the MT. The MT returns
the hash of the R1 as well as a challenge (R2). The PIC
responds to this challenge by sending the hashed R2.
Msg1.MT → PIC : Req
Msg2.P IC →MT : R1
Msg3.MT → PIC :MAC{R1}K , R2
Msg4.P IC →MT :MAC{R2}K
The full Casper’s description of the protocol is
mentioned in Appendix IV-A. After modelling this
protocol, Casper/FDR discovered the following attack.
1a. MT -> I_PIC : req
1b. I_PIC -> PIC : req
2a. PIC -> I_MT : R1
2b. I_PIC -> MT : R1
3a. MT -> I_PIC : R2, MAC {R1}K
3b. I_PIC -> PIC : R2, MAC {R1}K
4a. PIC -> I_MT : MAC {R2}K
4b. I_MT -> MT : MAC {R2}K
The notation I PIC, I MT represents the case where the
Intruder impersonates the PIC, MT respectively. As shown in
Fig 1, the discovered attack is a Man-in-the-Middle attack,
where the Intruder intercepts and replays the messages. This
attack could be interpreted as follows: the mobile terminal
will complete running the protocol believing that it was with
the PIC, while it was with the Intruder instead. Similarly, the
PIC will believe it has been running the protocol with the
MT, while in reality it was with the Intruder.
III. THE PROPOSED USER-LEVEL AKA PROTOCOL
The proposed protocol comprises two stages: the first
achieves mutual authentication between the PIC and the
MT. ,while in the second, the user is authenticated based
on his Biometric information. Similar to the AKA protocols
in GSM and UMTS [1] and to avoid the overhead of PKI,
the proposed protocol is based on a symmetric encryption
Figure 1. The Discovered Attack
Table III
NOTATION.
Abbreviation Full name and description
PIC The Personal Identification (PIC), initially shares
SK(MT) with the MT
MT Mobile Terminal
r1, r2, r3 Random numbers
miD Mobile device unique ID
PSeq PIC unique serial number
F, F1 Irreversible functions
K A secret key, derived to secure the connection
between the MT and the PIC: K = F (SK(MT),
r1, r2, miD, PSeq)
SK(MT) A pre-shared key between the PIC and the MT
Ackm An Authentication Token: Ackm = F1( MiD, PSeq,
random)
Enc{m}K Encrypting the message (m) using the key (K)
By considering the notations in Table III, the protocol
runs as follows:
Msg1.P IC →MT : {r1, Pseq}SK(MT )
Upon plugging the Personal Identification Card PIC
into the Mobile terminal MT, the AKA process starts by
sending a random number r1 in Msg1.
Msg2.MT → PIC : {MiD, r1, r2}SK(MT )
The MT constructs a challenge message Msg2 containing
a Mobile ID, a fresh challenge random r2 and the received
random r1, this message is encrypted by the pre-shared
key SK(MT). Using the information included in Msg2,
both ends generate a secret key K= F (SK(MT), r1, r2,
miD, PSeq) to secure the connection between the ends, the
uniqueness of the derived key is based on the freshness of
nonce r1, r2 and the secrecy of the pre-shared key SK.
Msg3.P IC →MT : {r3, r2}K
The PIC responds to the challenge in Msg2 by constructing
Msg3 which contains the received challenge random r2
and another challenge random number r3, this message is
encrypted using the derived secret key K.
Msg4.MT → PIC : {r3, Ackm}K
The MT responds by sending the received challenge
r3 along with the pre-shared acknowledgement string Ackm
via Msg4. As shown in Table III, the Ackm is derived
in a way to include the identities of the two parties (the
MT and the PIC), also it includes a fresh random value to
guarantee the freshness, this way possessing the Ackm will
help in achieving entity authentication as will be described
in section III-A1.
Msg5.P IC →MT : {Ackm}K
The SP verifies the included Ackm in Msg4 and composes
Msg5. In the case of a successful authentication among the
PIC, the MT and the user, the MT represents the PIC and
the user in the following stages of the AKA framework.
A. Formal Verification
We modelled our protocol by preparing a Casper input file
describing the UL-AKA protocol. For conciseness, we only
show here the #Specification and #Intruder headings, while
the #Free Variables, #Protocol Descriptions and #System
headings are included in Appendix IV-B.
The #Free variables heading defines the participating
parties, the variables and the used functions. It is worth
noting that Casper does not specify a built-in method to
simulate key derivation functions; therefore, we specifically
defined therein the function F which is used to derive the
session key (K) specific. The Protocol Description heading
specifies how the intended parties will use the functions to
generate the corresponding keys.
The security requirements of the system are defined
under the #Specification heading. The lines starting with
the keyword Secret define the secrecy properties of the
protocol. For example, the first line specifies SK(MT) as
a secret between the PIC and MT. The lines starting with
Agreement define the protocol’s authenticity properties;
thus, the first authenticity of the figure above specifies
that the MT is correctly authenticated to the PIC and
agreed on the nonce value (r3). The WeakAgreement(X,Y)
specification means that if Y thinks he has successfully
completed a run of the protocol with X, then X has
previously been running the protocol with Y.
# Specification
Secret(PIC,SK(MT),[MT])
Secret(MT,SK(MT),[PIC])
Secret(PIC,miD,[MT])
Secret(PIC,K,[MT])
Secret(MT,K,[PIC])
Agreement(MT,PIC,[r3])
Agreement(PIC,MT,[r2])
WeakAgreement(MT, PIC)
Figure 2. Casper/FDR Verification Result
WeakAgreement(PIC, MT)
The #Intruder Information heading shows that the
intruder identity is Mallory, the identities of all agents
and the nonce R1 are included in the intruder initial
knowledge. The Crackable keyword is used to simulate
key compromise attack, where a key is compromised either
through cryptographic techniques, or through the key being
stolen and then used to lead to a failure of authentication
in a subsequent session. We specify the pre-shared key SK
as compromisable.
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {PICard, Mobile, R1}
Crackable = presharedKeys
Running Casper/FDR tool verifies that none of the
checked assertions defined in the #Specification heading
was vulnerable to an attack as shown in Fig 2.
1) Protocol Analysis and Security Considerations: Al-
though Casper/FDR has shown no attack against the pro-
posed protocol, we need to carefully consider the result,
Casper/FDR proves the protocol in the system specified in
the System heading Appendix IV-B; however, the protocol
might be vulnerable in another system. Further analysis of
the protocol based on the security requirement list is given
in this section.
1) Mutual Entity Authentication:
There is no direct specification within Casper to
check this property, yet in order to show how our
protocol could meet this requirement, we explicitly
considered the Ackm value is generated as follows
Ackm = F (MiD,PSeq, random). This value is
pre-stored in the PIC and Mobile terminal. In Msg
4, 5 each entity ensures the other party to have the
right Ackm, which includes the parties’ identities as
parameters, thus, enforcing entity authentication. If the
MiD and Pseq were exposed, it is not feasible for
the Intruder to generate the Ackm, because it does
not know the right random value. Even if the Intruder
recorded Msg5, it could not be used in next sessions
because a fresh key K is used for each session.
2) Mutual Key Authentication:
The mutual authentication between the MT and the
PIC is based on the secrecy of the derived session
key (K). We got Casper to check this using the Secret
(PIC, K, [MT]) assertion check.
3) Mutual Key Confirmation:
This requirement is achieved by performing the checks
after Msg3 and 4 in the Protocol Description heading
Appendix IV-B. By using the Decryptable function
each party makes sure that the valid secret key K is
possessed by the other part. If the any of the check
failed, the protocol aborts.
4) Key Freshness:
Casper does not have any function to check this
requirement, so we included freshly generated values
r1, r2 in the derivation function of the the session
key K: K = F (SK(MT ), r1, r2,miD, PSeq) ; thus
the fact that Casper does not detect any attack on
the secrecy of the session key (K) implies that key
freshness is not violated.
5) Unknown-Key Share:
The Aliveness assertion is used to check this attack.
Additionally, making a binding between the Keys
and the parties’ identity deals with this attack. This
has been achieved in this protocol by including the
identities of the MT and the PIC in the KDF of the
K.
6) Key Compromise Impersonation Resilience:
We modelled this requirement by specifying the long-
term keys as crackable and using the Agreement as-
sertion to check any breach of the authenticity feature.
B. Biometric Information-Based Authentication
For this stage, we assume that the Mobile terminal is
equipped with a trusted Biometric information reader such as
fingerprint reader. When the user makes the initial contract,
a brief hashed value of the user’s biometric-information is
stored in the PIC.
After running the previous AKA protocol and setting
up a secure channel between the MT and the PIC, the
user is prompted to enter his biometric-information, the
MT processes the data and generates a hashed value of
the submitted info. This hashed value is passed to the PIC
which compares it with the previously stored value. In case
of match, the user is authenticated as the PIC owner and
consequently to use the MT. From this point onwards, the
MT will represent the user in both network and service level
connections.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In order for users to be able to delegate their devices to
join various access networks and contact a huge number of
services, credential information such as logins and crypto-
parameters are stored on these devices. However, to facilitate
such delegation, trust-relationship between the users and
their devices has to be achieved. Therefore, this paper
presented a novel AKA protocol to achieve mutual authen-
tication and set up a secure connection between the user
and its device. The protocol was verified using Casper/FDR
tool, also it was analytically proven to meet certain desired
security requirements.
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APPENDIX
A. The Device Authentication Protocol of the Mobile Eth-
ernet
# Free Variables
PIC, MT : Agents
r1, r2, r3 : Nonce
miD : DeviceID
K : SessionKeys
h : HashFunction
Req: message
InverseKeys = (K, K)
# Pocesses
INITIATOR(PIC,r1, K )
RESPONDER(MT,PIC, r2, miD, K, Req)
# Protocol Description
0. -> PIC : MT
1. MT -> PIC : Req
2. PIC -> MT : r1
3. MT -> PIC : {r1}{K}%v, h(r1), r2
[decryptable(v,K)andnth(decrypt(v,K), 1) == r1]
4. PIC -> MT : {r2}{K}%w
[decryptable(w,K)andnth(decrypt(w,K), 1) == r2]
# Specification
Secret(PIC,K,[MT])
Secret(PIC,r2,[MT])
Secret(PIC,r1,[MT])
Agreement(MT,PIC,[r1, K])
Agreement(PIC,MT,[r2, K])
WeakAgreement(MT,PIC)
WeakAgreement(PIC,MT)
# Actual Variables
PICard, Mobile, Eve : Agents
R1,R2, R3 : Nonce
MID : DeviceID
k : SessionKeys
InverseKeys = (k, k)
req: message
# System
INITIATOR(PICard,R1, k)
RESPONDER(Mobile,PICard, R2, MID, k,
req)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {PICard, Mobile}
B. The Proposed AKA Protocol
# Free Variables
PIC, MT : Agents
r1, r2 : Nonces
r3 : challNonce
SK : Agents -> presharedKeys
F : presharedKeys x Nonces x Nonces x
DeviceID -> SessionKeys
miD : DeviceID
K : SessionKeys
h : HashFunction
Ackm: Acknolwedgment
InverseKeys = (K, K), (SK, SK),(F, F)
# Pocesses
INITIATOR(PIC,r1,r3,Ackm) knows SK(MT)
RESPONDER(MT,PIC, r2, miD, Ackm) knows
SK(MT)
# Protocol Description
0. -> PIC : MT
1. PIC -> MT : {r1}{SK(MT)}
< K := F (SK(MT ), r1, r2,miD) >
2. MT -> PIC : {miD,r2,r1}{SK(MT)}
< K := F (SK(MT ), r1, r2,miD) >
3. PIC -> MT : {r2,r3}{K}%v
[decryptable(v,K)andnth(decrypt(v,K), 1) == r2]
< r3 := nth(decrypt(v,K), 2) >
4. MT -> PIC : ({Ackm, r3}{K})%w
[decryptable(w,K)andnth(decrypt(w,K), 1) ==
r3andnth(decrypt(w,K), 2) == Ackm]
5. PIC -> MT: {Ackm}{K}%w1
[decryptable(w1,K)andnth(decrypt(w1,K), 1) ==
Ackm]
# Specification
Secret(PIC,SK(MT),[MT])
Secret(MT,SK(MT),[PIC])
Secret(PIC,miD,[MT])
Secret(PIC,K,[MT])
Secret(MT,K,[PIC])
Agreement(MT,PIC,[r3])
Agreement(PIC,MT,[r2])
WeakAgreement(MT, PIC)
WeakAgreement(PIC, MT)
# Actual Variables
PICard, Mobile, Mallory : Agents
R1,R2: Nonces
R3, R4 : challNonce
MID : DeviceID
k : SessionKeys
InverseKeys = (k, k)
ACKM: Acknolwedgment
# Functions
symbolic SK, F
# System
INITIATOR(PICard,R1,R3, ACKM)
RESPONDER(Mobile,PICard, R2, MID, ACKM)
# Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {PICard, Mobile,R1}
Crackable = presharedKeys
